FNMA v. Bugna: California Assignment of Rents Provision and the Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 by Davies, Joanne N.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1998
FNMA v. Bugna: California Assignment of Rents
Provision and the Impact of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994
Joanne N. Davies
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joanne N. Davies, FNMA v. Bugna: California Assignment of Rents Provision and the Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 31 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 1453 (1998).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol31/iss4/16
FNMA V. BUGNA: CALIFORNIA
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS PROVISION AND
THE IMPACT OF THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1994
I. INTRODUCTION
California courts have traditionally interpreted assignment of
rents provisions in an incoherent and confusing fashion. On August
29, 1997, in Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Bugna,1 the California
Court of Appeal for the Fourth District joined past courts in this
vexatious tradition. The court held that a lender who is a beneficiary
under a recorded assignment of rents agreement must take an en-
forcement step, such as demanding the rents after the borrower de-
faults, before the lender can acquire a present possessory right to
collect the rents.
This decision is disagreeable to lenders because the end result is
unjustly determined by who can run the fastest. If the lender does
not have an automatic present possessory right to collect the rents
post-default than the lender must race to enforce the assignment of
rents before the debtor files for bankruptcy. Often times the lender
is left standing at the starting line while the debtor is running its vic-
tory lap because it filed for bankruptcy immediately after it de-
faulted.
The solution to this problem is obvious. Once a lender records
an assignment of rents it automatically acquires a present possessory
interest in the rents which the lender can exercise immediately upon
the borrower's default. In other words, once the borrower defaults, it
is no longer entitled to collect the rents as they automatically become
the property of the lender.
This Note addresses the problems California lenders have in pro-
tecting their security interest in rents. Section II briefly describes dif-
ferent assignment of rents provisions. Section III discusses the facts
1. 57 Cal. App. 4th 529, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233 (1997).
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of Bugna. Section IV details the reasoning of the court of appeal for
its decision in Bugna.
Section V provides a historic analysis of the assignment of rents
issue in both state and federal court. It explores the legislative intent
behind the enactment of former California Civil Code sections 2938
and 2938.1 which was the state's attempt at regulating rents. Section
V also examines new California Civil Code section 2938. In addition,
this section discusses Congress's intent in enacting the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, specifically the amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 552
titled "Postpetition effect of security interest." Section V also con-
siders how academics and practicing attorneys interpret the amend-
ment to 11 U.S.C. § 552 as well as certain bankruptcy courts' inter-
pretation of the amended statute.
Section VI analyzes whether the court of appeal correctly inter-
preted California state law in its decision in Bugna. Section VI also
examines the possible outcome of Bugna had it been decided under
applicable bankruptcy law. Additionally, section VII proposes a so-
lution for California lenders to avoid arguing with courts over their
interest in the rents. This Note concludes by arguing that the Bugna
court misinterpreted and ignored applicable law, and should there-
fore be discredited as reliable authority for future decisions.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS DEFINED
An assignment of rents is an agreement whereby a lender loans a
borrower money to purchase income-producing property, and re-
quests that, as additional security for the loan, the borrower assign
the rents to the lender.2 There are three different types of assignment
of rents agreements:
3
(1) An "absolute" assignment of rents allows the lender to im-
mediately start collecting rents on the property.4 Typically, the
lender would be responsible for collecting the rents each month and
would deposit them into a bank account. The lender would then
2. See Robert C. Leibsie, Enforcing Assignments of Leases, Rents and Prof-
its, 69 WIS. LAW. 26,26 (1996).
3. See Richard L. Wynne & Stuart J. Wald, Assignments of Rents: Absolute
or Non-Absolute? Cash Collateral or Not? Some Musings on the State of the
Fight, in "RENTS" IN BANKRUPTCY - NEW FRONTIERS 1 (The Orange County
Bankr. Forum ed., 1997); see also, Leibsie, supra note 2, at 26 (describing the
three different types of assignments).
4. See Wynne & Wald, supra note 3, at 1.
1454
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
withdraw the loan payment before permitting the borrower to use
any of the money."
(2) A "collateral" assignment creates a future lien in favor of the
lender, where "the rents are considered additional collateral for the
loan." Additionally, "the lender or an appointed receiver must take
physical possession of the property before any rents may be collected
by those parties."7
(3) A "conditional absolute" assignment passes "title" of the
rents to the lender when the borrower and lender enter into an
agreement! However, the lender allows the borrower to collect and
use the rents as long as the borrower does not default on the loan.9
The issue presented in Bugna was how the assignment of rents
ripened into a present possessory interest in the rents upon the bor-
rower's default. In other words, the court had to decide at what point
the lender acquired a present possessory interest in the rents.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1986, Randolph C. Bugna ("Bugna") borrowed $5,315,000
from Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA") so that he
could purchase an apartment complex.0  As security for the loan,
Bugna executed a note and trust deed in favor of FNMA.1' Para-
graph 26 of the trust deed included provisions for an assignment of
rents. 2
5. See id
6. Id.
7. Id
8. See id. at 1-2.
9. See id.
10. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th 529, 531, 67
Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 234 (1997).
11. See id.
12. Paragraph 26 provides in pertinent part:
As part of the consideration for the indebtedness evidenced by
the Note, Borrower hereby absolutely and unconditionally assigns and
transfers to Lender all the rents and revenues of the Property, includ-
ing those now due, past due, or to become due .... Borrower hereby
authorizes Lender or Lender's agents to collect the aforesaid rents
and revenues and hereby directs each tenant of the Property to pay
such rents to Lender or Lender's agents; provided, however, that prior
to written notice given by Lender to Borrower of the breach byBor-
rower of any covenant or agreement of Borrower in this instrument,
Borrower shall collect and receive all rents and revenues of the Prop-
erty as trustee for the benefit of Lender and Borrower, to apply the
rents and revenues so collected to the sums secured by this Instrument
in the order provided in paragraph 3 hereof with the balance, so long
as no such breach has occurred, to the account of Borrower, it being
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In 1987 Bugna conveyed the apartments to his spouse Mary
Bugna ("Mary") along with some other properties. 3 In 1988 Bugna's
other creditors, not including FNMA, filed an involuntary Chapter 7
proceeding against him.'4 The bankruptcy trustee ("trustee") ob-
jected to the transfer of the apartments to Mary, and the court en-
tered a judgment on December 1, 1992, that nullified the transfer and
reinvested title in Bugna.' Upon reinvestment, the apartments be-
came an asset of the bankruptcy estate and the trustee took posses-
sion and started collecting rents. 6
Bugna did not default on his loan with FNMA until October 1,
1992.7 On December 3, 1992, FNMA sent a written notice to both
Bugna and Mary stating that it was exercising its rights under the
deed of trust to collect rents and revenues of the apartments.' 8 The
next day FNMA filed an action for judicial foreclosure 9 and notified
intended by Borrower and Lender that this assignment of rents consti-
tutes an absolute assignment and not an assignment for additional se-
curity only. Upon delivery of written notice by Lender to Borrower of
the breach by Borrower of any covenant or agreement of Borrower in
this Instrument, and without the necessity of Lender entering upon
and taking and maintaining full control of the Property in person, by
agent or by a court-appointed receiver, Lender shall immediately be
entitled to possession of all rents and revenues of the Property as
specified in this paragraph 26 as the same become due and payable,
including but not limited to rents then due and unpaid, and all such
rents shall mediately upon delivery of such notice be held by Bor-
rower as trustee for the benefit of Lender only; provided, however,
that the written notice by Lender to Borrower of the breach by Bor-
rower shall contain a statement that Lender exercises its rights to such
rents. Borrower agrees that commencing upon delivery of such writ-
ten notice of Borrower's breach by Lender to Borrower, each tenant
of the Property shall make such rents payable and pay such rents to
Lender or Lender's agents on Lender's Written demand to each tenant
therefor ....
Id. at 531-32, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 234.
13. See id. at 532, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. When a debtor defaults on its obligations under the note, the
beneficiary of a deed of trust can enforce its lien on the underlying property in a
judicial foreclosure. See Stephen P. Milner et al., Foreclosures, Private Sales and
Deeds-In-Lieu in California: Understanding and Planning for the Debtor's Tax
Consequences, 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 161, 161 (1994). In order to accomplish this
the beneficiary obtains a court judgment ordering the sale of the property. See
id. The sale is conducted by a levying officer and the proceeds are then applied
to reduce the debt. See id. If the proceeds are not enough to cover the indebt-
edness the beneficiary may obtain a deficiency judgment. See id. at 163.
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Mary that it was requesting the appointment of a receiver to take
over the apartments?
Unfortunately, FNMA was not aware of the December 1st
judgment that revested the property in Bugna.1 When FNMA
learned of the judgment, it realized that the automatic stay in bank-
ruptcy would prevent the appointment of a receiver to take posses-
sion of the property.' Consequently, FNMA could no longer pursue
a judicial foreclosure action.2 FNMA contacted the trustee and reas-
serted its security interest in the rents from the apartments and re-
quested that rents collected by the trustee be safely kept for FNMA's
benefit.'
On October 6, 1993, the bankruptcy court granted FNMA's re-
quest for relief from the automatic stay, thereby permitting FNMA to
pursue state court remedies2 A few weeks later, FNMA filed an ac-
tion in state court for judicial foreclosure and requested that the state
court appoint a receiver.26 Pursuant to FNMA's request, the court
appointed a state court receiver effective November 1993.2 The trus-
tee continued to collect rents from the apartments until November
1993.2 With permission from the court, the trustee abandoned the
apartments and stopped collecting rents because he believed that the
sale of the apartments would not yield enough equity for the bank-
ruptcy estate.' The trustee transferred more than $337,000 in rents
collected to the state court receiver in December 1993.'
20. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 532-33, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235.
21. See id. at 533, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235.
22. As soon as a voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed, the
automatic stay is effective.
This automatic stay prohibits creditors from taking virtually any col-
lection action against the debtor .... The automatic stay prohibits liti-
gation for pre-bankruptcy debts, enforcement of judgments against
the debtor, any action against the debtor or the estate's property (the
action prohibited includes obtaining liens, perfecting liens or enforc-
ing liens), and any act to collect from the debtor.
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Courts Recognize Lenders'
Rents Interests?, 23 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 833, 837 & n.17 (1990); see 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(1)-(6) (1993).
23. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 533, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 533 n.1, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235 n.1.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 533, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 533, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 235-36.
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In March 1994, FNMA nonjudicially foreclosed31 on the apart-
ments and received a credit bid32 that was $1.3 million short of the
amount due on the note.3 3 FNMA requested a state court order re-
quiring the receiver to forward to FNMA any rents the receiver had
in its possession, including the rents transferred to the receiver by the
trustee. 4 Despite Bugna's objection, the trial court granted FNMA's
request and gave the state court receiver permission to forward the
rents to FNMA.35
Bugna appealed the trial court's decision and asserted that
FNMA should not receive the rents collected before November 8,
1993.36 Bugna argued that before this date FNMA had not made a
valid written demand informing him that FNMA was exercising its
right to collect rents as required by paragraph 26 of the deed of
trust.7 In response to Bugna's assertion, FNMA argued that "no
written demand is necessary because on default [FNMA] is automati-
cally entitled to all post-default rents without the necessity of a writ-
ten demand."'38
The court of appeal stated that FNMA had a "perfected security
interest in the rents."39 Nonetheless, the court found that the deed of
trust required "an additional step-making a written demand exercis-
ing its rights-to enforce that security interest; therefore FNMA is
entitled only to those rents collected after the demand was made."40
31. See id. The beneficiary under a deed of trust may choose to hold a pri-
vate sale upon the debtor's default. See Milner et al., supra note 19, at 163. The
property is sold at a public auction after proper notice has been given to both the
public and the debtor. See id. The court is not involved in a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure, and the beneficiary cannot get a deficiency judgment if the sale price is in-
sufficient to cover the indebtedness. See id.
32. "A secured creditor has the right to 'credit bid' its lien on the property.
Thus, a secured creditor can purchase property subject to its lien by being the
high bidder and paying cash only to the extent that the purchase price exceeds
the amount of its liens." Allan S. Brillant, Sale of Assets in Bankruptcy, in
DOING DEALS 1997: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF TRANS.
ACIIONAL PRACTICE 1045, 1050 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B4-7168, 1997).
33. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 533, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 236.
34. See id at 534, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 236.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. IM
40. Id.
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. Trust Deed Required FNMA to Make a Written Demand
Notifying Bugna of its Exercise of its Rights to Rents
The court first interpreted the parties' contract as a whole.4' In
addition, it resolved any ambiguities in the contract against FNMA,
because the trust deed used was a standardized contract drafted and
selected by FNMA.42 The court next interpreted the terms of the
contract, specifically paragraph 26 of the deed of trust:
Our review of paragraph 26 as a whole convinces us writ-
ten notice of default and demand for rents is the event defining
the date FNMA becomes entitled to the rents. Paragraph 26 re-
fers to delivery of "written notice" on several occasions and
states that "prior to delivery of written notice" borrower may
collect and receive the rents. It then provides that "[u]pon de-
livery of written notice" FNMA becomes entitled to
"possession of all rents and revenues . . . as the same become
due and payable, including but not limited to rents then due and
unpaid, and all such rents shall immediately upon delivery of
such notice be held by Borrower as trustee for the benefit of
Lender only." This language does not provide that rents col-
lected before notice is given (i.e., rents no longer due and un-
paid) are held by borrower for FNMA. Finally, the trust deed
contains instructions on how rents "collected subsequent to de-
livery of written notice" shall be applied, but is silent on how
rents collected prior to that notice should be applied, strength-
ening the interpretation that rents collected prior to the notice
are not due FNMA.43
FNMA argued that upon default Bugna automatically became a
trustee for FNMA and collected the rents solely for FNMA's bene-
fit.' FNMA also argued that the only purpose for the written de-
mand was to terminate Bugna's right to collect the rents.4
The court held that FNMA's interpretation of the provision in
the deed of trust was incorrect." "The express language of paragraph
26 states that upon notice FNMA is entitled to 'due and payable'
41. See id. at 535, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 236.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 535, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237; see supra text accompanying note 12.
44. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 535-36, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237.
45. See id. at 535, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237.
46. See id. at 536, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237.
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rents and that 'such rents,' which do not include previously collected
rents, shall be held by Bugna as trustee for FNMA '[u]pon delivery of
written notice."'4 7
FNMA cited In re Scottsdale Medical Pavilion to reinforce its
position that Bugna's right to retain the rents automatically termi-
nated upon default.49 In Scottsdale, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel ("Panel") held that a debtor's right to keep the rent
for his own benefit automatically terminates at default, even though
the debtor can still collect the rent after default.' The Panel held
that these post-default rents collected by the debtor were subject to
the creditor's security interest even if the creditor had not taken any
enforcement steps.5'
The Bugna court stated that Scottsdale was inapplicable because
the Panel decided Scottsdale under Arizona law and FNMA made no
effort to analogize Arizona law and California law.' In addition, the
Bugna court stated that it could not tell whether the language in the
security agreement in Scottsdale included a "written notice" require-
ment as did the language in paragraph 26.
B. Under Former California Civil Code Sections 2938 and 2938.1
the Assignment of Rents was Ineffective Until FNMA Took
an Enforcement Step
The Bugna court next analyzed the issue of enforcement under
California law. The court stated that it found the holding of In re
GOCO Realty Fund 1 to be persuasive since that case applied Cali-
fornia law to a trust deed containing provisions similar to paragraph
26 of the deed in this case.55 The GOCO Realty court analyzed for-
mer California Civil Code section 2938(b)(2)56 and came to the con-
clusion that:
47. Id.
48. 159 B.R. 295 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993).
49. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 536, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 237-38.
50. See Scottsdale, 159 B.R. at 301.
51. See id.
52. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 537, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238.
53. Id.
54. 151 B.R. 241 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993).
55. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 537, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238.
56. "[N]otwithstanding any provision... that would otherwise preclude or
defer enforcement of the rights granted the assignee. . . ." CAL. CIV. CODE §
2938(b)(2) (West 1993) (repealed 1996).
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[t]he literal words of the statute plainly anticipate an en-
forcement step by a lender who holds legal title to rents arising
from a perfected conditional absolute assignment of rents before
the lender is entitled to possession .... However, the lan-
guage of the statute leaves ambiguous the question of entitle-
ment to rents after perfection but before enforcement of the as-
signment.
The GOCO Realty court resolved this ambiguity by defining per-
fection as a protection of the lender's security interest from an inter-
vening third party.58 The court further stated that if the lender
wanted to acquire the actual right to collect the rents it must take an
additional enforcement step. Until that time the borrower is entitled
to the rents collected before the enforcement step is taken.59
In support of its position, the GOCO Realty court cited numer-
ous California cases and secondary sources, and concluded that "a
lender's right to possession of rents arises only upon both the bor-
rower's default and the lender's demand for possession. Although
Cal.Civ.Code § 2938 may obviate the need for a further perfection
step, it cannot be read to obviate the need for a further enforcement
step."6
The Bugna court stated that under the 1996 amendment to Civil
Code section 2938, a lender must take some perfection step after the
borrower defaults, such as writing a demand letter, before a lender
can exercise its entitlement to the rents.1
The 1996 amendments to section 2938 were designed to
avoid the confusion which plagued the courts in this area by
providing: (1) the assignment is a present assignment regardless
57. GOCO Realty, 151 B.R. at 247 (emphasis omitted).
58. See id. at 248.
59. See id
60. Id. The Bugna court's reliance on GOCO Realty as persuasive authority
was severely misguided. The GOCO Realty court in its holding completely ig-
nored former California Civil Code section 2938 and its legislative intent. The
court acknowledged that the statute was "intended to strengthen real estate
lenders' claims to rents in bankruptcy." Id. at 247. It also stated that former sec-
tion 2938 codified the holding of In re Ventura Louise, 490 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.
1974). See id. The GOCO Realty court interpreted the Ventura Louise holding
as stating that an absolute assignment of rents transfers title to the lender and
obviates the need for a further perfection step by the lender before it is entitled
to collect the rents. See id Nevertheless, the GOCO Realty court ignored all of
its discussion above and relied on an 1898 case, which required an enforcement
step, as persuasive authority. See id. at 249 (citing Bank of Woodland v. Heron,
120 Cal. 614,52 P. 1006 (1898)).
61. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 538,67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 238-39.
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of the language used to create it (subd.(a)); (2) the assignment
is fully perfected when properly recorded (subd. (b)); and (3)
upon default the creditor could collect rents which accrued but
were unpaid and uncollected "[o]n and after the date the as-
signee takes one or more of the enforcement steps" described in
subdivision (c), such as making demand for the rents on the
borrower (subd. (c)(4)). Thus, the new statute clearly provides
that a creditor holding an absolute assignment is not entitled to
rents, collected prior to the date it takes one of the enforcement
steps.'
C. Former Section 2938 Did Not Eliminate the Need for an
Enforcement Step
FNMA stated that the legislative history of former section 2938
supports its finding that the section eliminated the requirement of an
enforcement step to terminate the debtor's right to rents.63 Moreo-
ver, FNMA stated that the purpose behind section 2938 was to
"strengthen a lender's position against a bankruptcy trustee by con-
ferring 'perfected' status to liens created by an 'absolute assignment
conditional on default' clause." '"
The Bugna court reasoned that even though section 2938 pro-
vided a statutory grant of perfection against third parties, this did not
eliminate the need for the enforcement step.6 In contrast to FNMA's
assertion, the court believed that the legislative history supported the
finding that an enforcement step was still necessary." Although the
court recognized that the initial proposed language67 of the statute
62. Id at 538 n.6, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239 n.6 (citing Norma J. Williams et al.,
Assignment of Rents-The Next Generation, 15 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 27, 33-34
(1997)).
63. See id. at 539, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239.
64. Id (citing Sylvia P. O'Neill, Assignment of Rents: Mystery or Enigma?, 10
CAL. REAL PROP. J. 20,21 (1992)).
65. See id
66. See id.
67. The proposed language reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the fact that an assignee may be required to en-
force its perfected interest in the rents by notice or through the ap-
pointment of a receiver. . ., the assignor who has granted an assign-
ment of rents ... shall collect the rents, issues and profits that are the
subject of the assignment as agent for the assignee, and the assignee's
interest in the rents, issues, and profits shall continue in the rents, is-
sues, and profits collected by the assignor....
Id. at 539, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239-40 (quoting California SB 326, as introduced
Feb. 11, 1991, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. 2-3).
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was consistent with FNMA's argument, opponents criticized the lan-
guageo and the drafters later deleted it.69 The court stated that the
deletion of the proposed language "constitutes strong evidence that
the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original
provision."7
Lastly, FNMA argued that in MDFC Loan Corp. v. Greenbrier
Plaza Partners7 1 the court held that former section 2938 "eliminates
the need for the lender to take steps beyond recordation of the trust
deed to be entitled to enforce its interests in post-default rents."'
The Bugna court addressed this issue by distinguishing MDFC
on its facts. In MDFC, when the borrower ("Greenbrier") defaulted,
the lender ("MDFC") recorded a notice of default and election to sell
under the deed of trust.73 MDFC then filed an action for judicial
foreclosure and specific performance. It further sought the appoint-
ment of a receiver to take control of the property and collect the
rents.74 On February 20, 1991, the day after the court granted
MDFC's request for the appointment of a receiver, one of Green-
brier's general partners filed an involuntary Chapter 11 petition
which placed Greenbrier in bankruptcy.75 MDFC requested that the
bankruptcy court dismiss the proceeding and, on October 10, 1991,
the court granted its request. 76 The receiver that the court appointed
68. The proposed language was criticized by a committee staff report as fol-
lows:
Case law holds that the mortgagee is entitled to rents only from the
date of his demand. Thus, case law does not allow the creditor to
automatically claim rents as far back as the date of default. This pro-
vision would do so. This added ability of the lender to reach more
funds would mean less funds for the debtor and the unsecured credi-
tors. WOULD NOT THIS PROVISION ESTABLISH AN
UNEQUAL PLAYING FIELD FAVORING LENDERS?
Id. at 539-40, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240 (quoting CALIFORNIA SENATE CoMM. ON
JUD., REPORT ON SB 326, APR. 9, 1991 HEARING, 1991-92 Reg. Sess. 4 (citation
omitted)).
69. See id. at 540, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240 (citing California Senate Amend-
ment to SB 326, Apr. 23, 1991, 1991-92 Reg. Sess.).
70. IL (quoting WDT-Winchester v. Nilsson, 27 Cal. App. 4th 516, 534, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d 511, 521 (1994) (quoting Central Delta Water Agency v. State Wa-
ter Resources Control Bd., 17 Cal. App. 4th 621, 634, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 459
(1993))).
71. 21 Cal. App. 4th 1045,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (1994).
72. Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 540,67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
73. See MDFC, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 1048,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
74. See id
75. See id.
76. See iL
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on February 19, 1991, took control of the property and began to col-
lect the rents.?
During the period that Greenbrier was in bankruptcy-from
February 20, 1991 to October 10, 1991-Greenbrier collected
$328,528.07 in rent from the property.78 After the court dismissed the
bankruptcy case Greenbrier refused to transfer the collected rent to
the receiver.79 Greenbrier then brought suit against MDFC in state
trial court and requested a temporary restraining order to prevent
MDFC from holding a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the property."
In order to bring suit the court required Greenbrier to deposit the
disputed rents with the clerk of the court at which time the clerk
transferred the rents to the receiver by stipulation of the parties.
81
Greenbrier lost its suit against MDFC and, therefore, MDFC
held a nonjudicial foreclosure sale." After the sale, the trial court
terminated the receivership and ordered the receiver to disburse the
total funds, $413,554.85, to Greenbrier." MDFC appealed the trial
court's decision."
The issue in MDFC was whether former California Civil Code
section 2938 entitled MDFC to all the rents collected after appoint-
ment of the receiver. 5 The appeals court stated the statute entitled
MDFC to exactly that.86 The appeals court held that:
[o]nce Greenbrier defaulted on the loan, a perfected transfer of
the property's income arose in favor of [MDFC], and it sought
to enforce the transfer by filing this action and seeking the ap-
pointment of the receiver. Thus, [MDFC] is entitled to all of
the funds held by the receiver when the receivership was "termi-
nated.87
The Bugna court asserted that MDFC did not address the same
issues as those in BugnaY In MDFC there was no claim by Green-
brier that MDFC had failed to take an enforcement step or that it
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1049,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1049-50, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
85. See id. at 1050,26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 1052-53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
88. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 540,67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
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had failed to make a timely demand for the rents from the property."
The Bugna court argued that it applied section 2938 consistently with
MDFC by holding that the statute entitled the lender to post-default
rents after the lender took an enforcement step.'°
The Bugna court concluded by reiterating its reasoning, "[w]e
conclude the enactment of section 2938 did not alter existing Cali-
fornia law requiring that a lender holding a perfected security interest
in rents must take some form of an enforcement step to terminate the
borrower's right to post-default rents."'" Therefore, by finding that
MDFC was distinguishable on its facts the Bugna court dismissed the
logic in MDFC and held that FNMA should not have received the
disputed rents.92
V. STATUTORY HISTORY OF ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
The modem difficulties associated with the protection of a
lender's security interest in rents began in 1979 when the United
States Supreme Court held in Butner v. United States93 that state law
should govern the validity and enforceability of security interests.94
The Supreme Court advised that bankruptcy courts should take
all necessary steps to guarantee that they afford the mortgagee the
same protection in federal bankruptcy court as it would have under
state law if no bankruptcy had ensued.95 The main reason the Su-
preme Court did not want to establish a uniform federal rule regard-
ing assignment of rents is because it did not want to encourage forum
shopping.96 The Supreme Court feared that a creditor who failed to
take the appropriate steps to meet the requirements of a state statute
would file an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against the debtor."
Consequently, the creditor would benefit from a federal rule auto-
matically respecting the creditor's right to rents.98 "Thus, a federal
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 540-41, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
92. See id. at 541, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
93. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
94. See id. "The justifications for application of state law are not limited to
ownership interests; they apply with equal force to security interests, including
the interest of a mortgagee in rents earned by mortgaged property." Id. at 55.
95. See id. at 56.
96. See Kathryn R Heidt, The Effect of the 1994 Amendments on Commercial
Secured Creditors, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 395, 401 (1995).
97. See id.
98. See id.
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rule that changes state law could cause parties to forum shop by
choosing bankruptcy."'"
The Supreme Court reasoned that:
Property interests are created and defined by state law.
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is
no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently
simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncer-
tainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party
from receiving "a windfall merely by reason of the happen-
stance of bankruptcy.""0
In reliance on Butner, bankruptcy courts looked to state law
when determining the validity of a security interest under an assign-
ment of rents provision.'O In Butner, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that Congress has constitutional authority to establish uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcies.' It stated that this authority
would "clearly encompass a federal statute defining the mortgagee's
interest in the rents and profits earned by property in a bankrupt es-
tate. But Congress has not chosen to exercise its power to fashion
any such rule."'' 3
The case history regarding the protection of a lender's security
interest in post-petition rents is contradictory and confusing.'m For
example, in bankruptcy cases certain courts decided that when the
debtor grants an "absolute" assignment of rents, the rents are outside
the bankruptcy estate and the lender may simply collect them.0 5 If
99. Id.
100. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (quoting in part Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l
Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
101. See John Collen & Douglas Rosner, Protecting Assignments of Rents in
Bankruptcy: The Case for Following In Re KNM Roswell, 20 CAL. BANKR. J.
197, 198 (1992).
102. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 54.
103. Id.
104. See Paul P. Daley et al., Rents: When Are They Cash Collateral?, in REAL
EST. WORKOUTS & BANKR. 1992,773,784-85 (1992).
105. See id.; see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. International Property
Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that an abso-
lute assignment of rents automatically gave the lender the right to the rents when
the debtor defaults); In re Ventura-Louise Properties, 490 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1974) (holding that the lender was not required to enter the premises prior
to collecting the rents under an absolute assignment).
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the debtor grants a "collateral" or "conditional" assignment of rents,
the courts' decisions have typically fallen into four categories."°
Some courts found that the recordation of the assignment of
rents perfected the lender's interest in the rents.1°7 Other courts held
that the lender's recordation of the assignment of rents was enough
for the lender to perfect its interest in the rents even though the
lender may not have taken the necessary steps to enforce its rights to
the rents under state law.1°s
In contrast to this deference to lender's rights, certain courts re-
quired that, in order for a lender to protect its post-petition security
interest in the rents, the lender must take some pre-petition action.'O,
This action could consist of requesting that a receiver be appointed to
collect the rents or the lender actually taking possession of the prop-
erty." Finally, other courts allowed lenders to perfect their interest
in the rents post-petition by filing a motion that qualifies as a notice
under 11 U.S.C. § 546.1
This confusion regarding assignment of rents was frustrating for
lenders and courts. Therefore, both the California Legislature and
Congress enacted statutes in an attempt to clarify the confusion sur-
rounding the perfection of an assignment of rents.
A. State Legislative History
Traditionally, California embraced a lien theory of mortgages."
The lien theory of mortgages impacts a creditor who holds a lien on
106. See Daley, supra note 104, at 785.
107. See id. at 785,788; see also, In re Somero, 122 B.R. 634, 638-39 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1991) (reasoning that recordation completely perfects a lender's rights to
rents).
108. See Daley, supra note 104, at 785, 789-92; see also In re Rancourt, 123
B.R. 143, 148 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1991) (deciding that, while the recordation of the
assignment of rents is not sufficient to allow the lender to enforce its rights to
rents, the recordation does protect the lender's interest in post-petition rents).
109. See Daley, supra note 104, at 785.
110. See id. at 785, 792-96; see also, In re Concord Mill Ltd. Partnership, 136
B.R. 896, 900 & n.9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (requiring that the lender make a
ceremonial entry to assert its right to possession of the property and requiring
that the lender take possession of the property if the debtor permits).
111. See Daley, supra note 104, at 785, 796-99; see also In re Harbour Pointe
Ltd. Partnership, 132 B.R. 501, 504 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1991) (establishing that the
lender's filing of an adversary proceeding to protect its security interest in the
rents was sufficient to qualify as notice under 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)).
112. See Sara H. Reynolds, A New Look at Secured Creditors' Rights to Rents
and Profits: Is the Pendulum Swinging Back?, 15 CEB REAL PROP. L. REP. 257,
259 (1992).
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real property by disallowing a right to possession of the property
until the creditor has foreclosed its lien.' Therefore, a creditor with
a security interest in rents "has merely an inchoate lien and the
debtor in possession may continue to collect the rents and profits...
[until the creditor] take[s] steps to 'perfect' its interest in rents be-
yond merely recording its assignment of rents.' '14 This perfection of
the creditor's security interest does not occur until the creditor takes
possession of the rents either personally or through a court appointed
receiver."5
Over time, California developed two distinct assignment of rents
provisions that differ slightly from the national model. California de-
veloped both an "absolute" and "additional security" assignment
model."6 In California in an "absolute" assignment, the borrower ac-
tually transfers its interest in rents or profits to a lender."' Con-
versely, in an "additional security" assignment the borrower merely
promises its interest in the rents to the lender, but does not actually
transfer its interest to the lender."' An "additional security" assign-
ment models the lien theory of mortgages, where the lender cannot
collect the rents until it takes additional steps to perfect its interest in
the rents."9
The type of provision used determined what legal status Cali-
fornia law applied to the lender."2 This differentiation had significant
legal consequences for the lender if the borrower filed for bank-
ruptcy.121 Under an "absolute" assignment the lender perfected its
interest in the rents when it recorded the assignment.' Therefore, if
the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the rents were not part of the bank-
ruptcy estate as they belonged to the lender."z In an "additional se-
curity" assignment the rents became part of the bankruptcy estate
unless the lender had taken the necessary steps to perfect its interest
in the rents.
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUD., REPORT ON SB 326, JULY
17, 1991 HEARING, 1991-92 Reg. Sess.
117. See id
118. See id.
119. See id
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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The California Legislature enacted California Civil Code section
2938 in order to clarify ambiguity surrounding the legal consequences
that attached to the different assignment of rents provisions. An ex-
amination of the evolution of section 2938 is necessary to understand
why the logic used by the Bugna court was flawed.
1. Former California Civil Code Sections 2938 and 2938.1
In 1991, the California League of Savings Institutions sponsored
California Civil Code section 2938i2 in response to the increased
avoidance of lenders' interest in rents by debtors in bankruptcy
court.126 While most of these challenges to lenders' interest in rents
regarded "additional security" assignments, lenders feared that debt-
ors could apply these same challenges to "absolute" assignments.'
2
The sponsors wanted the legislature to codify the rule that "an
'absolute' or 'additional security' assignment of rents in conjunction
with a real property loan is a 'perfected' interest at the time of as-
signment when that assignment has been executed, delivered and
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938 (West 1993) (repealed 1996). Section 2938, as in
effect prior to 1996 legislation, read:
(a) A written assignment of interest in rents, issues, and profits of real
property made in connection with a loan secured by real property,
stating that it is absolute, shall be deemed to constitute a present
transfer of the assignor's interest in existing and future rents, issues,
and profits of that real property effective upon the execution and de-
livery of the assignment by the assignor.
(b) An assignment of an interest in rents, issues, and profits of real
property, as described in subdivision (a), may be recorded in the rec-
ords of the county recorder in which the real property is located in the
same manner as any other conveyance of an interest in real property,
whether the assignment is in a separate document or part of a mort-
gage or deed of trust, and when so duly recorded in accordance with
the methods, procedures, and requirements for recordation of con-
veyances of other interests in rea property, (1) the assignment shall
be deemed to give constructive notice of the content and effect of the
assignment with the same force and effect as any other duly recorded
conveyance of an interest in real property, and (2) the interest granted
by the assignment shall be deemed perfected as of the date ot recor-
dation, notwithstanding any provision of the assignment or of any
other provision of law that would otherwise preclude or defer en-
forcement of the rights granted the assignee under the assignment
until the occurrence of a subsequent event, including, but not limited
to, a subsequent default of the assignor.
Id.; see CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON JuD., REPORT ON SB 326, APR. 9, 1991
HEARING, 1991-92 Reg. Sess.
126. See id
127. See id.
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recorded."' Following its enactment, section 2938 only codified this
rule as applied to "absolute" assignment of rents."
California courts had great difficulty distinguishing between
"absolute" and "additional security" assignments." Courts, in an at-
tempt to make sense out of the disarray, focused on the language of
the agreement rather than examining the substance of the agree-
ment.13 1 Section 2938 also held form over substance by stating it pro-
tected any assignment that used the magic language "absolute" even
if the substance of the assignment was for security purposes.' Sec-
tion 2938 "overrules the long-standing rule that.., an assignment of
future rents made for purposes of security only attaches to rents ac-
cruing after the assignee takes affirmative enforcement action. Un-
der the statute, as written, the assignee's lien attaches immediately to
all accrued and accruing rents."' 33 Thus, a literal reading of section
2938 seemed to indicate that as long as lenders included the word
"absolute" in the assignment of rents, recordation of the assignment
perfected the lenders' interest in the rents.
Lenders whose assignment of rents did not contain the magic
word "absolute" were unhappy with this application of section 2938.
Section 2938 does not satisfactorily resolve the difficult prob-
lems raised by assignments of rents. Certain of these problems
occur because an absolute assignment of rents to a lender is
usually intended as an assignment for security. Although the
two types of assignment differ in form, in the lending context
they usually serve the same function, which is to secure the re-
payment of indebtedness."
In 1992, California lenders returned to the legislature requesting pro-
tection for lenders who received "additional security" instead of
"absolute" assignments. 35 In response the legislature added section
128. Id.
129. See Sylvia P. O'Neill, Assignment of Rents: Mystery or Enigma?, 10 CAL.
REAL PROP. J. 20 (1992).
130. Brian L. Holman, California Assignments of Rents: A Proposal for a Co-
herent Methodology of Perfection and Enforceability, 22 CAL. BANKR. J. 127, 127
(1994). Mr. Holman is a California attorney who specializes in bankruptcy,
commercial law and workouts. See id. at 127 n.1.
131. See id. at 127.
132. See id. at 150.
133. Id. at 151.
134. O'Neill, supra note 129, at 21.
135. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUD., REPORT ON SB 1323, JULY
1, 1992 HEARING, 1991-92 Reg. Sess.
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2938.1 to the Civil Code.36 Section 2938.1 allows lenders who hold an
assignment of rents given as additional security to perfect this as-
signment by recordation.la Therefore lenders need not take posses-
sion of the property, appoint a receiver or take any other action to
perfect the assignment.13
Critics of sections 2938 and 2938.1 argued that the statutes were
ambiguous on their face because they failed to provide substantive
meaning for the status of being "perfected., 139 Although the defini-
tion of the term "perfection" may be unclear, the relevant legislative
history suggests that the "purpose behind both § 2938 and [§ 2938.1
was] to prevent [lenders'] rights to rents from being cut off by a
bankruptcy filing."' 14
In conclusion, the legislature enacted these statutes for the pur-
pose of "perfecting" lenders' interest in the rents upon recordation,
regardless of the form of assignment, and preventing a bankruptcy
court from requiring lenders to take some enforcement step after the
debtors file a bankruptcy petition.4
136. See CAL. CIrv. CODE § 2938.1 (West 1993) (repealed 1996). Section
2938.1, as in effect prior to 1996 legislation, read:
(a) An assignment of the rents, issues, and profits of real property,
stating that it is given as additional security, is perfected by the recor-
dation, in the county in which the real property is located, of an in-
strument granting that assignment. Recordation shall perfect that as-
signment without the necessity of the beneficiary or mortgagee
obtaining possession of the real property, appointing a receiver, or
taking any other action.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), until such time, if any, as the
trustor or mortgagor is in default of its obligation to the beneficiary or
mortgagee, the beneficiary or mortgagee shall not exercise any rights
to collect the rents, issues, and profits.
(c) An assignment as additional security may be contained in a mort-
gage, deed of trust, or other recorded instrument.
(d) This section shall not invalidate assignments as additional security
which have been perfected by other means prior to January 1, 199
and shall only apply to assignments as additional security which are
executed on and after January 1, 1993. This section shall not apply to
assignments of rents, issues, and profits of real property which state
that they are absolute, as provided-in Section 2938.
Id-
137. See O'Neill, supra note 129, at 21.
138. See id.
139. See Holman, supra note 130, at 151.
140. Reynolds, supra note 112, at 262.
141. See H. Mark Mersel & Jess R. Bressi, Lethal Weapon-Recovering
Prepetition Retainers From Debtor's Counsel, 21 CAL. BANKR. J. 239,246 (1993).
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2. New California Civil Code Section 2938
The California legislature resolved the confusion resulting from
sections 2938 and 2938.1 in 1996 when they repealed the statutes and
enacted new section 2938.14"2 The Assembly Committee on Judiciary
stated that former section 2938 provided lenders holding an absolute
assignment conditional on default an immediate right to the rents
upon the occurrence of some future event, such as, loan default.
1 43
The committee acknowledged that judicial interpretation of
former section 2938 was inconsistent since one case held that further
enforcement was necessary while another case held that the statute
did not require any enforcement action144 In addition, the committee
stated that former section 2938.1 provided that lenders holding an
"additional security" assignment could perfect their interest upon
recordation, "and relieves the entity entitled to the Rents under the
assignment (assignee) from having to foreclose or appoint a receiver
in order to perfect the interest."' 45 Further, the committee acknowl-
edged that the statute was ambiguous as to what steps were required
for lenders to enforce their rights.146
In 1995, the Real Property Law Section of the State Bar of Cali-
fornia sponsored new California Civil Code section 2938 in response
to the many unanswered questions that existed under the former
statutes.47 The new statute clarified the steps lenders need to take to
secure an interest in the rents at the time lenders create the assign-
ment.'4 It also established the right of borrowers to keep the rents
until they default on the loan.149
The California Bankers Association was also a proponent of new
section 2938 and asserted that it was critical "that any question about
the enforceability of the 'security' for the loan be resolved by statute
in a clear and unambiguous manner. Absent such clarifications, con-
tinued commercial financing in this area is at risk."'5
142- See CAL. Crv. CODE § 2938 (West Supp. 1998).
143. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUD., REPORT ON SB 947, MAR.
27, 1996 HEARING, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. [hereinafter MARCH REPORT ON SB 947].
144. See id. Compare In re GOCO Realty Fund I, 151 B.R. 241 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1993), and MDFC Loan Corp. v. Greenbrier Plaza Partners, 21 Cal. App.
4th 1045, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596 (1994).
145. MARcH REPORT ON SB 947, supra note 143.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
1472
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
New section 2938 reconciled the ambiguities that existed in for-
mer sections 2938 and 2938.1.151 Specifically, section 2938(c):
States that, upon the default of the borrower (assignor), the as-
signee is entitled to collect and receive all of any Rents that
have accrued but are unpaid and uncollected or that will accrue
if the assignee either: a) has a receiver appointed; b) obtains
possession of the Rents; c) delivers a written demand (as speci-
fied) for the Rents to one or more of the tenants; or d) delivers
a written demand for the Rents to the assignor."
New section 2938 only applies to contracts entered into on or after
January 1, 1997.153
By enacting former sections 2938 and 2938.1, the California legis-
lature moved away from the requirement of an enforcement step.
The legislature enacting these sections properly wanted to protect
lenders' interest in the rents by providing lenders a present posses-
sory interest in the rents as soon as lenders record the assignment of
rents. Therefore, the enactment of new section 2938 and the court's
decision in Bugna is unmistakably a step backward in the evolution of
California real property law because it strips lenders of this protec-
tion.
B. Federal Legislative History
In light of the rapid progress of reform in the state legislatures,
Congress decided to address lenders' concerns and solved the issue in
1994. During the late 1980's and early 1990's, debtors filed a prolif-
eration of bankruptcy cases as a result of declining real estate val-
ues " 4 Lenders were critical of this trend as they perceived the Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy process to be too debtor-oriented. 5 Debtors'
unreasonable delays in the reorganization process as well as debtors'
unrestricted use of the rents during bankruptcy frustrated lenders. 6
151. See id.
152. Id.
153. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 2938(i) (West Supp. 1998). "Sections 2938 and
2938.1, as these sections were in effect prior to January 1, 1997, shall govern con-
tracts entered into prior to January 1, 1997, and shall govern actions and proceed-
ings initiated on the basis of these contracts." Id.
154. See Eugene A. Pinover & Marc Abrams, Bankruptcy Amendments: BAA
Expected to Level the Playing Field in Real Estate Cases, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 19, 1994,
at 5, 5.
155. See id.
156. See id.
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994"s ("Reform Act") was
"designed to level the playing field and alleviate these perceived
abuses of the bankruptcy process.""15 As a result, a number of provi-
sions in the Reform Act had an important impact on the rights of
commercially secured lenders.59 Congress enacted these new provi-
sions in order to provide clarity to existing case law and correspond-
ing state law' 60
Senator Hatch expressed the importance of the Reform Act:
Mr. President, the Bankruptcy Act of 1994 is one of the
most important pieces of economic legislation to be considered
and passed by the 103d Congress. It is important because it
clarifies many of the existing ambiguities in our bankruptcy law
that have, in essence, discouraged the extension of new credit
to our businesses in Utah and throughout the Nation.
The bill responds to these concerns by offering clear guid-
ance to both creditors and debtors as to the risks they are under-
taking. It strikes a fair and delicate balance between the rights
and responsibilities of creditors and the rights and obligations of
debtors. More importantly, it encourages the credit community
to extend much needed new capital to the well deserving busi-
nesses in our communities seeking to grow and expand. In
sum, this bill is good for business, good for creditors and good
for consumers. 6'
Specifically, the Reform Act introduced a provision that would
provide a more balanced and ameliorative approach to determining
whether a lender has an interest in post-petition rents by amending §
552(b). 62
1. Legislative interpretation of the Reform Act's amendment of
11 U.S.C. § 552(b)
The Reform Act revised § 552 of the Bankruptcy Code titled
"Postpetition effect of security interest." ' The adverse effect of
157. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4150
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
158. Pinover & Abrams, supra note 154, at 5.
159. See Heidt, supra note 96, at 395.
160. See id.
161. 140 CONG. REc. S14,464 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
162. See Pinover & Abrams, supra note 154, at 6.
163. 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1978)). In both the
House and Senate this amendment was titled "protection of security interest in
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Butner on secured parties concerned the drafters of the Reform Act
because "a secured party's right to rents generated by the collateral
depended on whether the secured party was entitled to the rents un-
der state law."1"4
A recurring problem in bankruptcy proceedings was whether the
lender perfected its interest in the rents before the debtor filed the
bankruptcy petition. As noted above, the various states did not agree
when lenders perfect an interest in rents. This disagreement caused
inconsistencies in the court system. The purpose of the amendment
to § 552 was to provide lenders with consistent results regardless of
the variations that occurred within each state's law.16 Amended §
552(b)(2) reads as follows:
(2) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544,
545, 547, and 548 of this title, and notwithstanding section
546(b) of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a se-
curity agreement before the commencement of the case and if
the security interest created by such security agreement extends
to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of
the case and to amounts paid as rents of such property or the
fees, charges, accounts, or other payments for the use or occu-
pancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or
other lodging properties, then such security interest extends to
such rents and such fees, charges, accounts, or other payments
acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to
the extent provided in such security agreement, except to any
extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on
the equities of the case, orders otherwise. 66
Philip S. Corwin, serving as Director and Counsel of the Ameri-
can Bankers Association, testified in front of the Subcommittee on
Economic and Commercial Law regarding bankruptcy reform. 67 As
part of his testimony, Mr. Corwin analyzed the effect that an amend-
ment to § 552 would have on commercial lenders.'" Mr. Corwin
postpetition rents." 140 CONG. REc. H10,768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (section-by-
section description of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994).
164. See Heidt, supra note 96, at 396.
165. See id. at 399-400.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)(1994).
167. See Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and
Commercial Law, 103rd Cong. 191 (1994) (statement of Philip S. Corwin, Direc-
tor & Counsel, Operations and Retail Banking, American Bankers Association).
"American Bankers Association is the national trade and professional associa-
tion for America's commercial banks .... " Id
168. See id. at 191-92.
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stated that banks acting as real estate lenders faced significant diffi-cultis undr .. 161
culties under current bankruptcy practices.
He illustrated this point to the subcommittee with the following
scenario that is all too familiar to commercial lenders. If a real estate
developer defaults on a loan, the lender will institute a foreclosure
action, a lengthy process that may take up to one year before com-
pletion."' In order to avoid the foreclosure, the debtor will file a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition which prevents the lender from pur-
suing the foreclosure action due to the automatic stay.' The court
then allows the debtor 120 days to file a plan of reorganization, and
often the court is willing to extend this filing period.'" As time
passes, the debtor continues to collect the rents and to use them for
his own purpose, such as paying his attorney's fees or using them for
his own personal benefit. 3 Chances are, the debtor has not used the
rents to maintain the property or pay taxes and insurance.74
The bankruptcy court seldom confirms the Chapter 11 plan, be-
cause the debtor does not have enough capital to make it feasible. 75
So, at the end of this wearisome process, the lender will take posses-
sion of the potentially rundown property knowing that the rents re-
ceived during this process are unavailable to rehabilitate the prop-
erty.
1 7 6
Mr. Corwin believed that debtors in this typical scenario abused
the bankruptcy process and that the legislature needed to address this
abuse." For this reason, Mr. Corwin supported the revision of § 552.
"[American Bankers Association] believes that the severity of the
difficulties currently facing mortgage lenders on loans already out-
standing, and the growing abuse of single asset reorganizations by
real estate developers, suggests that a remedial federal statute would
be the most expeditious and effective means for addressing this
problem.',
178
169. See id. at 211.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. lE at 212.
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Essentially, new § 552(2)(b) gives lenders the benefit of auto-
matic perfection once debtors file the bankruptcy petition.179 There-
fore, after new § 552 bankruptcy courts treat lenders uniformly, re-
gardless of the requirements that may exist under state law.1'8
Some critics argue that the statutory language does not provide
this plain meaning and state that it may provide the opposite mean-
ing.18' The legislative history of the statute, however, supports the
pro-lender interpretation... "According to Congressman Jack
Brooks, the amendment to § 552(b) 'provides that lenders may have
valid security interests in postpetition rents for bankruptcy purposes
notwithstanding their failure to have fully perfected their security in-
terest under applicable State law.""13
The participants at several hearings regarding the amendment to
§ 552(b) clearly understood the meaning of the statutory language.
The National Bankruptcy Conference ("NBC") presented a detailed
statement of its position on Senate Bill 540 at a hearing before the
Subcommittee on Court and Administrative Practice to discuss the
protection of security interests in post-petition rents."" It was the
NBC's understanding that:
As drafted, proposed Section 552(b)(2) would give a se-
cured creditor an interest in postpetition rents as long as the se-
curity agreement was duly recorded in public records, whether
or not the security interest is perfected as a matter of applicable
nonbankruptcy law.
* * * Thus, [proposed Section 552(b)(2)] would give a se-
cured creditor with an interest in these items more rights under
the Bankruptcy Code than they might enjoy under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.'
179. See Heidt, supra note 96, at 400.
180. See id. In amending the Bankruptcy Code, Congress nullified the United
State Supreme Court's concern in Butner that a uniform federal standard would
lead to forum shopping. The concern for lenders' rights and the ambiguity of
state statutes and courts' interpretations of those statutes outweighed this con-
cern of forum shopping.
181. See David Gray Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 S.C. L. REv. 1075, 1085-
86 (1995).
182. See id. at 1085.
183. Id. (quoting 140 CONG. REC. H10,768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Brooks)).
184. See The Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 540 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, 103rd Cong. 102 (1993) (statement
of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
185. Id. at 128-29 (statement of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
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William J. Perlstein who testified on behalf of the American
Bankruptcy Institute at this same hearing also shared this interpreta-
tion of proposed § 552(b)(2)."6 "The bill clarifies that, so long as the
creditor had a duly recorded security interest, it is not necessary to
have perfected that security interest, such as by having had a receiver
appointed, in order for the security interest to apply to postpetition
rents."" 7
Finally, Edward Miller testified on behalf of the American
Council of Life Insurance ("ACLI").'8 Mr. Miller acknowledged that
often times a debtor will take advantage of the bankruptcy system by
filing under Chapter 11 right before a creditor can exercise its as-
signment of rents under state law.'89 The debtor does this to prevent
the creditor from enforcing its interest in the rents during the bank-
ruptcy proceeding."° Mr. Miller stated that proposed § 552(b)(2)
"simply precludes the debtor from ignoring a creditor's bargained for
interest in the rents and squandering them during the Chapter 11
case."'
191
Mr. Miller set forth several policy reasons for ACLI's support of
this proposed section. First, there will be a substantial amount of
savings in both time -and expense because this provision creates more
certainty for both the creditor and the debtor.'" Thus, this will make
more money available for capital investments.' 93 In addition, debtors
will not institute so many bankruptcy filings if they know their plan
does not have a reasonable chance of confirmation, and therefore,
the bankruptcy system will become more efficient.'94
Most importantly, the House of Representatives and Senate in-
terpreted proposed § 552(b)(2) consistently with those who testified
186. See id. at 162, 174 (statement of William J. Perlstein, American Bank-
ruptcy Institute).
187. Id. at 174 (statement of William J. Perlstein, American Bankruptcy Insti-
tute).
188. See id. at 354 (statement of Edward Miller, American Council of Life In-
surance).
189. See id at 355 (statement of Edward Miller, American Council of Life In-
surance).
190. See id. (statement of Edward Miller, American Council of Life Insur-
ance).
191. Id. (statement of Edward Miller, American Council of Life Insurance).
192. See id. at 356 (statement of Edward Miller, American Council of Life In-
surance).
193. See i. (statement of Edward Miller, American Council of Life Insur-
ance).
194. See id. (statement of Edward Miller, American Council of Life Insur-
ance).
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above. The House initially issued a report on these proposed
amendments on October 3, 1992.195 At this time, the House had a
clear understanding of the issues involved with the protection of a se-
curity interest in rents. It recognized that, in a number of states, real
estate lenders were unable to perfect their security interests in the
rents before a bankruptcy filing.196 The initial House Report and a
subsequent House Report both acknowledged that the proposed bill
"provides that lenders may have valid security interests in post-
petition rents for bankruptcy purposes notwithstanding their failure
to have fully perfected their security interest under applicable State
2. Academics and practicing attorneys' interpretation of the Reform
Act's amendment of 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)
Not only did Congress understand the impact of this revision to
the Bankruptcy Code, academics and practicing attorneys also under-
stood the implications. In the treatise titled Norton Bankruptcy Law
and Practice, the author recognized that the only time that the court
should look to state law to determine whether the lender took appro-
priate enforcement actions to perfect his security interest in rents is if
the case had commenced prior to October 22, 1994, the effective date
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.198
In a Practice Law Institute ("PLI") publication, Mr. Jeff Bohm
and Mr. David B. Young, both attorneys, argued that when Congress
created § 552(b)(2) it clearly overturned Burner and created a uni-
form national system for protecting lenders' rights to the assignment
of rents in bankruptcy.'" The PLI authors illustrated this conclusion
by pointing to a recent bankruptcy court opinion which stated that
"[s]ection 552(b)(2) offers a compelling example of congressional in-
tent not to let states decide freely what shall be property of the
195. See H.R. REP. No. 102-996, at 23 (1992).
196. See id.
197. Id-; see also H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 49 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340 (same language used as in initial House Report).
198. See 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRACTICE 2D § 37:5, at 98 (2d ed. Supp. 1997).
199. See Jeff Bohm & David B. Young, Small Business and Single Asset Real
Estate Reorganizations and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, in 2 19TH
ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
465, 527 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-753,
1997).
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debtor." Therefore, § 552(b)(2) clarified lenders' rights to post-
petition rents."'
The PLI authors acknowledge that the assignment of rents are
subject to the bankruptcy estate's long-arm avoidance powers.'
Critics therefore argued that if state law requires lenders to take an
enforcement step post-default, such as securing a receiver, and lend-
ers failed to do so, then state law leaves lenders with an unperfected
interest in the rents.2 The authors strongly asserted that "such an
interpretation would violate every canon of statutory construction.
This type of argument would render 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) self-
nullifying and meaningless, and it would frustrate the obvious intent
of Congress." ' A reasonable interpretation of § 552(b)(2) is that an
assignment of rents is a valid lien in bankruptcy as long as lenders re-
cord the assignment pre-petition.'
Additionally, Mr. H. Mark Mersel and Mr. Jess R. Bressi, spe-
cialists in bankruptcy law, corporate reorganizations and business
litigation, state that § 552 "provides, inter alia, that the security inter-
est resulting from a security agreement which encumbers rents..
and which is duly recorded prepetition, extends to all postpetition
rents and income without requiring the secured creditor to take any
further 'perfection' action. '' 0
3. Judicial interpretation of the Reform Act's amendment of
11 U.S.C. § 552(b)
In the case In re Fairview-Takoma Ltd. Partnershipm the same
issue faced the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland as
faced the California State court in Bugna. Fairview Takoma Limited
Partnership ("Fairview"), the debtor, owned a residential apartment
complex.2" When Fairview purchased the property, it executed an
assignment of rents in favor of the lender.' The recordation of the
assignment of rents occurred a few days later in the Land Records of
200. Id. at 527-28 (quoting In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1018
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996)).
201. See id. at 529.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Id. at 529-30.
205. See id. at 531.
206. Mersel & Bressi, supra note 141, at 239 n.1 & 240 n.4.
207. 206 B.R. 792 (Bankr. Md. 1997).
20& See id. at 795.
209. See iU.
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Prince George's County, Maryland.21 As a result of subsequent
transfers among lenders, Condor One, Inc. ("Condor") became the
mortgagee and holder of the assignment.2
On September 26, 1996, Condor hand delivered a letter to Fair-
view notifying Fairview that it had defaulted on the loan.2 2 Fairview
did not come current on the loan, therefore, on September 27, 1996,
Condor filed suit in state court and requested the immediate ap-
pointment of a receiver. 3 On the afternoon of September 27, 1996,
214Fairview filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy court. 1 As a re-
sult, the court stayed Condor's request for the appointment of a re-
211ceiver.
Fairview then requested that the bankruptcy court allow it to use
the rents generated by the property.2 Condor argued that it held a
lien interest in the rents as a result of the assignment of rents exe-
cuted by Fairview and recorded by the lender, and therefore, the
rents were cash collateral.27 Fairview disputed Condor's claim, stat-
ing that Condor failed to provide it with proper notice of default, as
required by the loan documents, before Fairview filed its bankruptcy
petition.218 As a result, Fairview asserted that it had the right to use
the rents as it saw fit in the ordinary course of its business.2 9
Judge Keir believed the main issue in the dispute between Fair-
view and Condor was whether Condor held an interest in the rents
under § 363(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 "Thus the Rents are cash
collateral to the extent that both Condor and Fairview's bankruptcy
estate hold an interest in the Rents, and to the extent that the Rents
are subject to a security interest as provided in § 552(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code."'
The court gave three alternate reasons for concluding that Con-
dor held a security interest in the post-petition rents.22 First, the
court found that the loan documents clearly conveyed an interest in
210. See id.
211. See idU
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 796.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 797.
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the rents to Condor."' Second, the court concluded that pursuant to
a Maryland statute that deals specifically with the issue raised in this
case, the perfection of Condor's security interest in the rents oc-
curred at the time of recordation.' Finally, the court stated that re-
gardless of state law, § 552(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, as added
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, mandates the same result;
that Condor had a security interest in the post-petition rents.25
Judge Keir acknowledged that while uncertainty among various
jurisdictions existed as to the appropriate test for determining
whether a lender had an interest in the rents, the Maryland legisla-
ture and Congress resolved the conflict.2  Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 "in order to
eliminate this uncertainty and clarify the appropriate treatment of a
security interest in rents subsequent to the commencement of a bank-
ruptcy case by a mortgagor." '
The bankruptcy court acknowledged that, in amending the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress nullified the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Butner.m Butner held that state law governed
when determining "the validity and extent of a mortgagee's interest
in the assets of a bankruptcy estate, including an interest in rents
generated by the mortgaged property."229
Judge Keir analyzed the legislative intent of the amendment to §
552(b)(2) and quoted an explicit statement of purpose from the
House Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19 94 .230
"Section 214 [of the Act] provides that lenders may have valid secu-
rity interests in post-petition rents for bankruptcy purposes notwith-
standing their failure to have fully perfected their security interest
under applicable State law."2' As a result, § 552(b)(2) eliminates the
necessity to analyze state law to determine whether Condor perfected
its interest in the rents for purposes of § 363(a).22
Apparently, lobbyists, senators, representatives, and academics
clearly understood the intent behind the amendment to § 552 in the
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 800.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id
230. See id. at 801.
231. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 48-49 (1994)).
232- See id.
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Reform Act. It is also clear that the bankruptcy court has a clear un-
derstanding of the legislative intent behind this amendment.
VI. AN ISSUE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
WHY BUGNA WAS WRONG
Determining whether FNMA had a present possessory interest
in post-default rents depended on whether it qualified under the
"perfected" language of former California Civil Code section 2938
and, due to the preemption of federal law on this issue, 11 U.S.C. §
552(b)(2). Obviously, this is a matter of statutory interpretation.
The United States Supreme Court established that courts should
interpret statutes to achieve their legislative intent. 3  California
courts have also recognized that a literal construction of a statute
may be inappropriate when the result clearly contradicts the apparent
legislative intent.24 Moreover, the California Supreme Court ruled
that when a court could determine the legislative intent, "a statute
must be liberally construed to effectuate that intent."'235
The Bugna court's interpretation of former section 2938 failed to
achieve the legislature's intent of expanding protection to lenders. In
addition, the Bugna court failed to interpret and apply 11 U.S.C. §
552(b)(2) which preempted the court's discussion of state law.
A. Bugna Incorrectly Interpreted State Law
First, the Bugna court stated that the terms of the assignment of
rents clause in the trust deed expressly required FNMA to provide
Bugna with written notice of default and demand for rents.36 Thus,
the trust deed only entitled FNMA to the rents collected post-default
after it gave Bugna a written demand. If the court had limited its
reasoning to a contractual interpretation of the trust deed the opinion
233. See Neil D. Okazaki, Note, People v. Sexton: Insuring an Absurd Result
Through Inflexible Interpretation-The Court of Appeal Denies Criminal Restitu-
tion to a Victim's Insurance Company, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 297, 313 & n.126
(1997). See e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (stating that
courts are to ascertain congressional intent and follow legislative will); United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) (stating that courts
must interpret statutes so as to give effect to congressional intent).
234. See Okazaki, supra note 233, at 313-14.
235. Id. at 314 (citing In re Haines, 195 Cal. 605, 613, 234 P. 886, 886 (1925)).
236. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th 529, 536, 67
Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 237 (1997).
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would be upsetting to lenders but doctrinally defensible.27 Lenders
could have remedied the problem by reworking the language con-
tained in their trust deeds?8
Unfortunately for lenders, the Bugna court relied extensively on
GOCO Realty, a bankruptcy court opinion that narrowly construed
former California Civil Code section 2938.2" The GOCO Realty
court held that former section 2938 allowed the borrower to continue
collecting the rents post-default until the lender took an enforcement
step.2'
FNMA argued that the purpose behind the legislature's enact-
ment of former section 2938 was to eliminate the requirement of an
enforcement step.2" As support, FNMA relied on the California
court of appeal's opinion in MDFC that held that former section 2938
eliminated the need for lenders to take an enforcement step.242 The
Bugna court responded by distinguishing MDFC on its facts.243 In
addition, the Bugna court argued that the initial draft of former sec-
tion 2938 was consistent with FNMA's interpretation, however, op-
ponents criticized the initial draft.24 The drafters reworded the stat-
ute after this criticism so the court concluded that the final version of
former section 2938 still required an enforcement step by the
lender. 5
Assuming the Bugna court was correct in relying on former sec-
tion 2938 to determine the validity of FNMA's security interest in the
rents, the issue is whether the court's interpretation of former section
2938 was consistent with the legislative intent.
Even if FNMA conceded that former section 2938 was ambigu-
ous on its face as to whether an enforcement step is necessary, the
legislative history supported FNMA's assertion that the statute
eliminated the requirement of an enforcement step. Lenders intro-
duced former section 2938 to stop debtors in bankruptcy from
237. See Memorandum from Dan S. Schechter, Professor of Law, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles, Federal National Mortgage Association v. Bugna, 1997
Westlaw 531085 (1997), (Sept. 1997) (on file with author).
238. See id.
239. See CAL. CIV. CODE. § 2938 (West 1993) (repealed 1996); GOCO Realty,
171 B.R. 241,241 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993).
240. See GOCO Realty, 171 B.R. at 248.
241. See Bugna, 57 Cal. App. 4th at 539, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239.
242. See id. at 540, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
243. See id.
244. See iL at 539-40, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 239-40.
245. See id. at 540, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 240.
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avoiding lenders' interests in an "absolute" assignment of rents.'
The legislature later extended this protection to "additional security"
assignments when it enacted former section 2938.1.247
The Bugna court was incorrect when it held that the amendment
to the initial draft of former section 2938 changed the statute's
meaning. If the court's conclusion was correct then the redrafting
completely nullified the original purpose of the statute, a conclusion
that defies logic. Furthermore, subsequent legislative hearing di-
rectly addressed this issue.
In 1996 the California legislature acknowledged that sections
2938 and 2938.1 were confusing and in response it repealed both of
the statutes and enacted new section 2938.2m Nonetheless, the As-
sembly Committee on Judiciary acknowledged that despite the in-
consistent judicial interpretation of the former statutes, the former
statutes provided that a lender holding an assignment of rents per-
fected its interest in the rents upon recordation. 249 In other words, a
lender did not need to take an enforcement step because a lender
holds an immediate right to the rents upon default.
The Bugna court's interpretation of former sections 2938 and
2938.1 was clearly erroneous and as such the court should have trans-
ferred all the rents collected post-default to FNMA.
In the future, however, new section 2938 should concern lenders
as it affects transactions created after January 1, 1997. New section
2938 eliminated any ambiguities that existed in prior statutes by de-
finitively stating that an assignment of rents does not entitle lenders
to rents collected after default but before demand. The new statute
further describes acceptable methods by which a lender can make a
demand. This statute creates a heavy burden on lenders to carefully
monitor borrowers, when a default occurs the lender must declare a
default and make a written demand for rents.
The real problem for lenders arises under the following scenario:
When the debtor defaults and then immediately files for bankruptcy.
In this scenario the lender does not have a chance to take an
246. See CALIFORNIA SENATE COMM. ON JuD., REPORT OF SB 326, APR. 9,
1991 HEARING, 1991-92 Reg. Sess.
247. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938.1 (West 1993) (repealed 1996).
248. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938 (West Supp. 1998).
249. MARCH REPORT ON SB 947, supra note 143.
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"enforcement step" before the bankruptcy filing.' During the bank-
ruptcy the rents are still collected21 Under new section 2938 the
lender is not entitled to the rents."2 Lenders must now look to the
Bankruptcy Code to determine whether they are entitled to rents
collected post-petition.
B. Bugna Failed to Apply Applicable Federal Law
In the above discussion this Note assumed, for purposes of
analysis, that the Bugna court was correct in applying California law
to determine whether the assignment of rents provision in the trust
deed entitled FNMA to post-default rents. Now, this Note will dis-
card this assumption and address whether the Bugna court's applica-
tion of California law was correct. This issue is relevant because in
Bugna the receiver obtained the rents in controversy during the
bankruptcy proceeding. It is possible that the Bankruptcy Code re-
quired Bugna to preempt its application of California law with an
application of relevant bankruptcy law.
As evidenced by the above discussion, uncertainty existed in
state law as to when an assignment entitled lenders to the rents.
Lenders frustrated with the inconsistencies that occurred as a result
of this uncertainty requested that Congress amend § 552 to provide
lenders with a consistent result regardless of the variations that oc-
curred within each state's law.
In response, Congress passed the Reform Act which amended §
552. Section 552(b)(2) now states that if a lender recorded the as-
signment of rents before default, the lender has a valid security inter-
est in the post-petition rents regardless of whether it met the en-
forcement requirements under state law. In other words, as long as
FNMA recorded the trust deed, FNMA had a valid security interest
in the rents collected post-petition even if FNMA did not meet the
perfection requirements as established by former California Civil
Code § 2938.
Essentially, amended § 552(b)(2) overrules Butner, which states
that bankruptcy courts should look to state law to determine the va-
lidity of a lender's security interest in the rents, and instead creates a
uniform federal rule regarding assignment of rents. The bankruptcy
court in Fairview understood perfectly the implications of this
250. See Memorandum from Dan S. Schechter, supra note 250.
251. See id
252 See iL
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amendment and held that § 552(b)(2) eliminates the necessity to
analyze state law to determine whether the lender perfected its inter-
est in the rents.
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR LENDERS
Regardless of the clarity that § 552(b)(2) brings to the analysis of
lenders' security interest in the assignment of rents, courts will most
likely continue to fail to apply the statute as intended. In order to
avoid costly litigation lenders in California will need to find creative
solutions to the problem.
One solution is for the lender to have control of the cash flow
from the property by requiring the borrower enter into a lock box or
blocked account system.23 In a lock box arrangement the tenants
send their rent payments to a specified post office box. A local
bank takes the payments from the post office box and deposits them
in accounts with that bank.2's The bank then agrees to transfer these
funds to the lender's account on a daily basis. 6
A blocked account system allows the borrower to collect pay-
ments from the tenants but it must deposit these payments into a
bank account under the control of the lender.' The lender monitors
the account daily to make sure the expected deposits are being
made.2s
Under a lock box or blocked account system the lender always
reserves the right to notify the tenants to make payment directly to
the lender.29 Depending on the cash flow from the property the
payments are first applied to the debt and then apportioned to the
borrower for payment of normal operating expenses.m
In order to survive bankruptcy, the arrangement should include
253. See Marsha E. Simms, Introduction to Secured Lending and Commercial
Finance, in AssET-BASED FINANCING 1996 19, 41 (PLI Commercial Law & Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. A-739, 1996).
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Craig H. Averch et al., Bankruptcy Issues: Emphasizing Drafting
Considerations in Protecting Against Insolvency (Including Selected Issues in
Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies), C950 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 303, 331 (1994).
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a provision that states it is effective on a post-petition basis.21 Fur-
thermore, the lender should include the terms of a cash collateral or-
der in the arrangement. 2 Finally, the borrower should execute an
acknowledgment stating that the lender has a perfected lien on the
rents from the property.23
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Reform Act revolutionized creditors' rights with respect to
assignment of rents. The Reform Act ended the federal bankruptcy
courts confusing attempts to interpret often contradictory state as-
signment of rents laws. Instead, it created a uniform rule of law
whereby a lender who holds an assignment of rents has a valid pres-
ent possessory interest in post-petition rents regardless of whether
the lender perfected the interest as required by state law.
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